Emmanuel Levinas (January 12, 1906 – December 25, 1995), the enigmatic philosopher who relied heavily on the Bible for his moral philosophy, developed a philosophical idea in which the “I” (anyone) is wholly responsible to the “Other” (another human being).
Moreover, Levinas understood his idea to move beyond general moral formulations and to work on the most basic level of being responsible for any person simply because they are another human being. As compelling and difficult as his idea is, it focuses only on human beings and does not take into account a responsibility to the world or non-human beings.
Levinas' Theory on Responsibility for The Other
In a passage from “Ethics as First Philosophy," Levinas insists that, “This summons to responsibility [for the Other] destroys the formulas of generality by which knowledge or acquaintance of the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man. In the face of the other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently the unique and chosen one.”
Levinas believes that an ethical “responsibility” to and for the Other requires that one always thinks and acts for the Other before one acts for himself. In other words, when person A is confronted with person B, i.e. “in the face of the other man,” person A is bound to consider the interests of the Other, person B, before considering his own interests.
This claim is made based on the idea that the “responsibility…destroys the formulas of generality by which knowledge or acquaintance of the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man.” What this means is, a primary ethical responsibility to other people as human beings shatters the generality of moral/ethical theories. Or more precisely, no matter the depth of knowledge of “generalities” used to understand the Other, the Other remains more than just conceptual knowledge.
Levinas also argues that any moral theory is so thoroughly wrought with vague and general ideas that they overlook the most basic desire to help another person. Theories “re-present” in words what one already feels emotionally or psychologically when “in the face of” another person. Moreover, re-presentation fails the Other, for it inherently tries to circumscribe the moral feeling that exists prior to conceptualization (moral theories).
Critiquing the Responsibility for The Other
As important as the idea to be ethically responsible to the Other at all times is, Levinas misses an important fact that: humans beings must also be responsible for the world they live.
For example, in Ethics and Infinity Levinas proclaims that “pure philosophy” is possible only by “going to the ‘social problem’”. This makes sense in the context of his ethical philosophy since the social problem is obviously a human problem. But what one cannot forget is that “social problems” exist within an environment, namely, the world. Sociality and its problems stem from the interactions of humanity with the world, not separate from it. The problems of hunger, biological genocide, the ability to provide shelter with materials, these do not come about within an empty vacuum.
And so, in order to live in a relationship with other human beings in the way Levnias prescribes, humans cannot forget that their ability to be social creatures is fundamentally possible by way of their dependence on the world/environment. Thus, only solving the problems involved with human interactions does not solve all the problems of existence. After all, humans live in a relationship with other human beings and with the world, so their problems are more than just human problems. And without the Other-as-world, human beings and their problems could not exist.
In short, the critique of Levnias’ ethical philosophy rests on its basic anthropocentric foundation. If Levinas wants all people to be fully committed to other human beings at all times, as well as to the “social problem,” people must remember that human beings and their “social problems” exist because the world exists. So if human beings disregard the world they disregard what makes them possible.
Sources:
Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. by Richard A. Cohen. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press: 2006).
Nathaniel Moya - Nathaniel Moya can be contacted at: abecedarianly@gmail.com. I look forward to any comments, suggestions, and/or opinions you may have ...
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